hate and Melancholy in
Anguish Jean Laplanche
Anguish Jean Laplanche
February 2004
hate and melancholy
"Perhaps take months after meeting a new patient, before they have any perception of 'use' private and unconscious that person makes me like object within the field of transfer (...) Some analysands create empathic identification points, and so leave room for the analyst to set them for a period, while other patients have a severe emotional distance that impoverishes the analyst's emotional life. "
(Bollas, p. 331)
(Bollas, p. 331)
The transfer destination is determined, among other factors, by the use of my patient as an object makes the internal flexibility with which we can move along the identifications, and the burden ambivalent, determined to a greater or lesser extent that you keep your belongings. One purpose of the analytical process is to make the difficult transition from narcissistic object choices, to achieve object relationships permeated by a genuine concern for the other, and not as a projective role provider with whom I can build up the image my desire. It is therefore vital to mourn the more infantile narcissism, and object losses real and fantasized.
Anxiety is an almost omnipresent factor in any mental process, and there is no possible way to make progress, either in theory or in the clinic, without a deep understanding of this affection.
In his text 'The Panic' Laplanche gives us a shortcut to link their own perspective of Freudian metapsychology, to understand the common ground between the anguish, the IDS, narcissism, object loss, ambivalence and melancholy, putting the unbinding with the object and the withdrawal narcissistic need to protect the ego of his own hatred toward the lost object, external and introjected.
Christopher Bollas offers an idea of \u200b\u200bhate, not the opposite of love and therefore the force link, but as a substitute. That is, the hatred is there to keep a link with the object.
I know there may be little justice to think together a theoretical fully rooted in exegesis Freudian metapsychology and more rigorous, with a position like Bollas, who in addition to Klein quoted at positions that give much more room for environmental effects, such as the relationship with the real mother is constantly referred to by Winnicott.
However, I think it is possible to try to explain the hatred, not as something that breaks the tie, but as something that supports it, since the model of melancholy as it is transmitted by Laplanche, in anguish.
In the internal structure of the book is a model for studying deeply consistent with making of psychoanalysis, which is holding a series of questions in relation to another, the thought of another, which in turn open up more Network of thought, without worrying too much to close roads and gates. The flight of dogmatism is a central task of analytical thinking.
Then, I will summarize some of the concepts that form the main lines: the problem between the drive and the object as the source of sexual fate, Eros and Civilization to the issue of repression, the crushing of the drives in the ego of the individual, the notion of censorship as barriers between systems and how the whole topic, directly or indirectly is linked to the notion of self and image of it. The issue of multiple definitions of self as a filtration system, such as content, as an instance, as representation.
The effect of anxiety as a drive activity, expression of somatic register stimulated by bodily sensations, many of which occur in contact with the mother, not as a source, but as an end. But that translated in terms of affection has to do with the anxiety caused by unconscious experience of helplessness and incompleteness, decay and the threat of death (by neglect of the object) as the primary space of the unknown.
One source of trouble is the inability of the total discharge of the drives. There is a desire in the fantasy of total discharge because the discharge itself produces pleasure, tension release, relaxation. Repression or dam we impose the reality principle prevents us from this download illusory.
In the second theory of anxiety Freud, 1924, ('Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety') develop new ways: on one hand is the notion of danger (anxiety as the response to the threat or the preparation for this, and On the other hand the new developments in relation to the ego of the second topic. The self is indicated not only as a place of trouble, but you can repeat the anguish of their own, at least as a signal.
In anguish, I struggle to maintain its integrity against its own painful experiences of objects that threaten to annihilate. Klein left, consistent with this, the experience of the divided self, the fear of being divided into pieces. The ego, Freud tells us, is primarily a "self-body." The synthetic I have a compulsion or even a reparative tendency, a tendency which was particularly focused Melanie Klein, and significantly, under the title of Eros, the life instinct.
C. Bollas refers to me as an unconscious organizing process that reflects the presence of mental structure. "The ego is a mental structure that develops from the dialectic of interior and exterior, the structure of the self is a story of personal development, all the attitudes, feelings and operations I suggest, even if we are unable apprehend the imprint of an object relationship. "(p. 22)
" Mother and son continually negotiate an intersubjective experience that coheres around the rites of the need psychosomatic. "Bollas writes (p.29)
Since there is no denying the truth instinct, "understood as the body is the repository of the first experiences that give rise to mental life," and it is also undeniable existence of an external object that is there from the start and is active in the exercise of 'awakening' to the life of the body and fantasies, the idea is still debatable whether it is the fantasies with which internal object structure to me, or if the fantasy is a reflection of me. Can there be aimless drive?, Can be drive without fantasy? There
Freud not only a theory of displeasure, but a theory of pain, which in relation to the body is considered as burglary. Displeasure, pain and distress related to the psyche and the body, as ways to bypass or metaphor as communicating these two domains: the psychic structure (particularly the ego) and the body. Writes in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety": "... we can see how the ideas proposed in the project clearly indicate the pain as a fundamental experience. Castration anxiety and anguish of death, ie, the absence of reference in the most essential experience of anguish.
There is a constant, since the start in his writings, of anguish and lack of respect, the absence of the object. Instead of the presence or the object representation (no) is the primary pain as basic experience of the psychic life, and the possibility of establishing all its mechanisms.
"Pain is an element left in parentheses, although we know on the other hand, the explanation that Freud gives of pain. It is an explanation 'economic', the pain is always a rush of energy that breaks or threatens to break a barrier, a limit (conceived as the limit of the body, skin boundary, or barrier or the boundary of I). "(Laplanche, pag. 297)
Anxiety involves re-live the terror oblivious to the disappearance of the big Other not only by this means to us with his presence and care, but because early identifications are so labile, that in an absence long enough to do just intolerable, it becomes a feeling of disaster and helplessness on me.
In an era of history Freud 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1915), and at one point the wording of Laplanche on anxiety, focus on the study of depression particularly melancholic depression. As part of the disease "moral", such neurosis (or psychosis) in particular that the moral seems to be in the foreground, are primarily obsessional neurosis and melancholia. The loss is the starting point of melancholy.
This writing is inseparable from one that is in 1914: Introduction to narcissism. And two points in the first instance we are interested in narcissism.
"On one hand, the introduction of the instance of the ideal and the superego, on the other, a reflection on the notion of object and object choice (...)
The original concept of narcissism: self-love and only himself, without any object libido, sense of omnipotence, the child's ego would enjoy all the qualities: a state that resembles megalomania. The child's narcissistic ideal is itself a reflection, or projection, the ideal of omnipotence (dethroned) that parents projected onto him.
'If we consider the attitude of parents towards their children tender, we will discern as a revival and reproduction of narcissism, has long abandoned. The overestimation, make clear that we cherish as narcissistic stigma and in the case of object choice, governs this bond. So the compulsion prevails attributed to the child of every kind of perfection, and conceal and forget all its shortcomings (which has a close relationship with the denial of infantile sexuality). ... Disease, death, renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions on free will and have to be in force for the child, the laws of nature and society should stop before it, and really should be again the center and the core of creation '(Freud, 1914, p.87)
This well-known passage ends the pretense of wanting to place, whether within the child or within the parent, the original narcissism: one can say that the narcissism of the parents is one of their own narcissism reviscencia child, but equally one can say that infantile narcissism is nothing that an identification by the child and a projection by the parents of their own narcissistic ideal dethroned. Whatever, anyway, the significance of infantile narcissism, it is true that quickly suffers a fate that brings him down: the castration complex. "(Laplanche, p.292)
Via this series of identifications and loss, appears object's shadow falling on the ego and the adult leaves some trace of their existence.
"The object can cast its shadow without a child is able to handle this relationship by mental representations or language For example, when a father uses his son to hold (...)
projective identifications must consider the experience that the child makes his first object. This is, of course, the mother, who is less known as a discrete object endowed with special qualities as a process that is bound to be the infant and the alteration of its existence. "(Bollas, p.18) explains
also a child 'embedded' in a family experience that is incomprehensible to him, failed to organize the experience in fantasies that cover the subject, save, therefore, the 'state of their own' determined by location unknown.
Word cushions and possible give new meaning to the angst. Enables it to transform and become the experience in a construction of meaning. This is not just for the elaborative effect of words, but mainly because they realize the presence of 'someone' that contains the baby, by his desire to provide reassurance. This presence is to be introjected as a good object originated. I anchor stone.
is, in Freud's work, "the first time that starts to show what will be the center of the new topical division of personality in identificatory instances, true personalities within the person , which were not instances of the first topic, much more abstract (...)
The 'ideal self' is placed next to an idealization of the omnipotence of the self: it is an idealized self, a self led to the best of his omnipotence. On the contrary, 'the ego ideal' appears as something that would stand against me as their ideal, certainly more linked to the problem of law and ethics. Feelings of inferiority should be placed rather on the side of the ideal self, and feelings of guilt or moral failure on the side of the ego ideal. "(Laplanche, p. 293)
The fact is that this omnipotent narcissism must find shelter somewhere and that is the 'ideal body' which is moved and perpetuates: "And on this I now love lies ideal self in childhood that I enjoyed the real. Narcissism appears shifted to this new ideal ego, as the child is in possession of all perfections valuable. The man is unable to waive the satisfaction of which once enjoyed. Do not want to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood (...) and try to recover it in the new form of the ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal. "(Freud, 1914 p. 91)
Back to Mourning and Melancholia, extending the feelings that make up the picture of depression, bereavement, bound to object loss, but also depression with feelings of inadequacy, of inadequacy, of not-worth, depression with self-accusation, guilt depression characterized melancholy. Freud
will distinguish three levels: first, the level of grief, then the level of pathological mourning, finally, melancholy.
"What is located in the center of the duel? This is what is indicated and with narcissism: the demonstration of the concept of object and certainly their loss. What matters in mourning, as in the other two models we will explain is the strength of the relationship with the object and what comes when that bond is tested.
The state of mourning can be described in a certain number of symptoms: loss of interest in the outside world, the loss of the ability to choose a new object of love, estrangement any productive work that is not related to memory the dead. This inhibition and the depletion of I express an unconditional surrender to grief.
inhibition is thus not a purely negative, is the fact that the subject is busy elsewhere.
The subject is so busy doing a job, But how does this work Grief? Its foundation is due to this: if the object has disappeared, the connection to the object exists, so the subject is facing a triple option. The first to perish with the object and the second, subsisting on the loop, it is also keeping the object, quasi-magical, almost hallucinatory or frankly. Are prolonged indefinitely duels in which the subject keeps alive the lost person is still living with her and eventually hallucinations. Third possibility: the duel itself. In this case respect for the reality that prevails on the bonding, the reality requires the subject change, to annul their relationship with a person that henceforth no longer present. "(Laplanche, p. 297)
essential part of this work is that as the attachment to the lost object increases before declining, efforts are needed to assemble and integrate into the psyche an image of that object built using the 'cleavage parties good and bad of the object, partial idealization, partial identifications, particularly with the good points of the object, desexualization loop with the object, which is coupled with idealization, and finally you can recall what is the relation to the Oedipus detachment : continue the work done in common, but leaving the parent, the beloved object. " (Laplanche, p. 298)
In all these aspects of the object, and at different times, the speech is going to permeate, so that each time the analysis is to ask Who's Talking Now?, what aspect of what the subject has taken the floor, and for whom?, who am I now facing the speaker? It is necessary to analyze the characters, or even the 'partial characters' involved in the life of the transfer. That is, an analysis of the identifications.
C. Bollas writes that the clinician must accept "being used as an object and be guided through their own inner world, between memory and the subject keeps their object relations (...)
analyst should not modify the intensity of the transfer by sending the patient back to his mother and his early life, until he has confronted and examined the nature of mental life on the inside of the transfer. "(p. 22)
The picture of melancholy, as described in the text on p. Laplanche 299, is largely identical to a picture of grief, but more accentuated, and with something else: moral pain reaches its climax clearly expressed so pathetic, the inhibition is much stronger also accompanied with a total neglect most basic care, such as food, the loss of interest by the outside world beautiful in this case with an absolute self-centeredness, the loss of the ability to love is put to the fore by psychiatrists, because they also brag about the sick, who accuse their own inalienability and this, in apparent contrast to the pain that otherwise reveal. "The patient has described in his self as unworthy, sterile, morally despicable (...) he humbles himself before everyone else and commiserations to each family to have ties with one so unworthy." (Freud, 1915 p. 244)
This and other signs suggest something that underlies the construction of these symptoms, which responds to a deeper truth that has to do with the second point of the dynamics of melancholia, the point that interests me most: the identification with the lost object.
The subject certainly know who has lost but not what that person has lost. Ignore what the type of relationship with that object, the Freud aspects that will highlight are: the fact that a link was ambivalent, and that was a narcissistic loop. Hatred is a similar loop, while at the same time is ambivalent, divided and narcissistic.
In the first instinct theory of Freud, love and hate were conceived as fraternal twins. Love wanted to get pleasure and pleasurable things, and hate it unpleasant expelled to the outside world, equating hatred with destruction: "The ego hates, abhors and pursues a destructive to all objects which are to him sources of unpleasant feelings" (Freud, 1915)
Hatred had two potential functions: go to a soul purpose (reproduction of a state above) if he was considered an aspect of the death instinct, or play a purely expulsive - destructive if it was conceived in the earlier theory of instincts.
"psychoanalytic theory are not lacking in references to the destructive hatred. If we now consider the hate in the theory of object relations, we assume in the course of a complex an internal object is damaged or destroyed and I was faced with the difficult task of renegotiating the inner reality following the trail of that hatred. An internal object damaged by hatred can lead to a flight phobic external representations of the object, or a state of depression addictive that constitutes a compromise formation between the desire to do more damage to the object and the fear of being attacked from within because that destructiveness.
I think that in some cases a person hates his order not to destroy, but to do just the opposite: keep the object. That hatred is fundamentally non-destructive by its intent and, although it may have destructive consequences, it is possible that its purpose is act in an unconscious form of love: it preserves the link by way of maintaining a passionate negative cathexis of it. Viewed this way, the hate is not the opposite of love, but his replacement. A person who hates so no fear of retaliation from the object, in contrast, welcomes you. In contrast, lives in fear of indifference, if not noticed or seen by the other. The passionate hatred is generated as an alternative to love, which is unattainable. " (Bollas, p. 148)
Think of it as that identification with the lost object has many features in common with the identification with an object destroyed or damaged. The disruption and devastation are integrated to me by way of an object attacking from the inside, that poor, and that via projective identification can then be living abroad.
Returning to the comparison with grief. In the match we had a loss of the object; herein is intended to Freud have something as a loss of self.
The discussion with the object, in mourning, melancholia is transposed to the discussion of the self. The melancholy begins with a duel, since there is always something that is foreign to a loss, that shortly after comes to be internalized. In the duel, the object "missing" in every sense of the term: in the sense that it is not already, and the sense of foul us. (Why hast thou forsaken me?)
will have to ask, in any case, what is the missing object (in transfer)? and, in what space is placed the damaged internal object, is currently placed on the side of the analyst or the patient?
Identification with the lost object: "Freud distinguishes between two types of identification. Identification which replaces the choice of subject, ie the ambivalent relationship (made of love and hate) with the other. The prototype of this identification is in the Oedipus complex, in this case, the ambivalent relationship with the father to the man, made of rivalry, but also of love, is partly transformed into identification with the father secondary identification. Secondary, not only regarding the fact that it comes after a investimento object, but also by relation to a mode of identification that would be the most primitive of the relationship with the object of primary identification to come, not replace a relation to the subject, but to coincide with it: it is at the same time relation to the other and assimilation with the other. In the early relationship with the mother, coupled with love and inclusion are: love of the breast, chest incorporation, are one and the same thing to love is to enter itself, is to take the chest. "(Laplanche, p.304)
On the narcissistic emphasis Freud, unlike Melanie Klein, who will stop at the ambivalent aspect of the loop.
To show that character of relationship with the object in melancholia, Freud part of a specific trait is self-accusation and guilt consuming.
"Both in scientific and in the therapeutic would be fruitless to try to oppose it against the patient against his self promoting such complaints. That in some sense has to be right and has to paint something that is as he seems "
(Freud, 1915 p. 244)
Freud never said so clearly extent to which the analyst must begin by listening, keep track of what is said, to the end, instead of treating the symptom as wishful thinking that should be corrected.
"Once in a material sense, factual, the melancholic is right. Melancholy indeed makes it useless, worthless. Perhaps the melancholy not do more to grasp the truth more clearly than others, not melancholy. When an extreme self insignificantucho is depicted as selfish, insincere, a man dependent only striven to hide the weaknesses of their status, perhaps in ourselves we seem to be pretty close to self-knowledge and we only intrigue the reason why one should get sick to reach a truth "(Freud, 1915 p. 244)
In the same spirit, C. Bollas explains that the patient compels the analyst to experience their inner world of objects. Part of the mental representations that a patient keep their objects, will be a fairly accurate record of the true nature of that mother's personality as reflected in the care of the child, while others communicate mental representations of the inner world projective identifications the infant. Each organization
analyzing real experience to constitute a suitable material for a powerful mental activity, as is the projection.
In Mourning and Melancholia, another notion is still convoluted with the idea identification, it is the notion of narcissism and narcissistic object choice, that is, taking itself as object of love. But two running alongside interpretations of psychoanalytic thought. One would make it narcissism, a sort of closed circuit of self-sufficient monad, which is no longer possible to distinguish a subject and an object. For another current, however, narcissism can not be understood only as love directed at me, it constituted a kind of direct relationship with the other. From this second perspective (Laplanche) we can say that narcissism is narcissistic identification are one and the same thing.
From this point, Laplanche (p.306 - 308) makes a somewhat cryptic explanation of the movements of the self through the intricate web of identities. I will summarize the essential ideas of this point to go after studying the process in which ambivalence and I can split the back part against himself (via identification)
Having located narcissistic identification, hay a little better equipped to understand the 'narcissistic object choice. " This narcissistic object choice object to object choice for shoring. In latter, love, sexuality and more specifically, he points the way to the vital relationship with the other relationship related to self-preservation.; in this way, the relationship of sexuality will be marked not by an identity with the other, but by a kind of complementarity. By contrast, the narcissistic object choice, the choice is both complementary to each other much the same. His motor is always a hidden identity.
What are the dynamic characteristics of the narcissistic choice, those that allow us to better understand what happens in melancholia? It would be a contradiction between its high stiffness, and great fragility. Rigidity and inflexibility, lack of adaptation to the contingencies of the object. Fragility in the sense that the lowest gap, the lowest failure of the object, just by touching that point identificatory, may cause a withdrawal and an abandonment of the object.
The melancholy is precisely what we observe, this withdrawal, this neglect, to the point of the leak. The time of the loss can be so blind that only by analyzing it is discovered.
There must have been the one hand, a strong fixation on the object of love, and the other a low resistance of the investiture of the object.
Consequently, a regression of the election narcissism narcissistic object, the self investimento. But even that withdrawal marks the totalitarian nature of the relationship narcissistic. This withdrawal is not a pure and simple neglect, is a sharp ability to re-find himself free of any object. The recall involves the object interior. It is then a new ID, a secondary identification, which is created in the process melancholy: "The shadow of the object falls on the ego, which can then be judged by a particular instance as an object, such as the abandoned object."
If 'the shadow falls on me' is because the object was already selected on the model of self. We have therefore
passage the narcissistic choice, loss of object, identification with the lost object.
This explains why the melancholic debate is a debate with himself, which replaces the discussion with the external object as given in the match.
But why the melancholic debate with himself takes this extremely aggressive, as plaintiff, destructive and even deadly in the suicide of melancholy? The notion of identity is not enough to explain it, we need a new development in terms of a third factor, which is the factor of ambivalence.
Ambivalence is the coexistence of love and hatred in any relationship with the object. At the juncture of impulses in relationship with the other, is always exposed to the possibility of disunity. And what is called 'transformation' of love into hate is nothing to Freud, the alloy disunity. Once this divisive primary alloy is ambivalent object loss. Always the lost object is the object to free herself. Provided the loss is attributed to the unconscious to an abandonment, a fundamental unassisted, which is ultimately that of the mother, the loss of love.
In Freud is the passion, hatred, which makes the otherness between thought, making it possible death. Thanks to the mark of failure, arises mark the origin of thought. In this sense, development can be seen as a defense against anxiety. While it is she who reigns within the psychic apparatus are secured by the silence of not knowing. Silence distress and disorganization, but that is at once the source of knowledge of the other work. Hence, when the need is thwarted, there is the anger and the interim, the anxiety. So also, as endogenous and constitutive masochism appears as a defense against death anxiety. Returning to Laplanche
: "We in the match: object loss, in pathological mourning, object loss ambivalence.
In melancholia, the object is introjected but as 'bad object'. The lost object is, as any object of love, both good and bad. And even if it was his good looks that dominated (consciously at least) in the ambivalent affair at the time of their loss is 'cleaved' and 'introjected' bad only in the form. Why? On the one hand because every lost object is somehow a bad object. Moreover, because the subject, has a particularly intense ambivalence, much more than usual in the relationship. Finally, because the loss is often a total loss. Freud insisted that the loss in melancholia, is a loss hidden secret. This is not contingent until absolutely necessary. Indeed, there is only one part of the object which is affected and this is precisely the good part. Therefore, the object is damaged, deprived of what he did, in the eyes of the subject, good and like it, is reduced to its bad side and that side is the introjected. Here is how Freud described this process without recourse, however, the notion of splitting and without insisting on the fact that it is only bad aspect of the introjected. (P. 310)
"This conflict of ambivalence, sometimes external source, other constitutional rather, it should not be overlooked among the premises of melancholy. If love for the object (...) takes refuge in narcissistic identification, hatred rages that purpose replacement insulting, denigrating, causing him to suffer and gain from this suffering sadistic satisfaction. "(Freud, 1915 p.248-9)
Laplanche adds that the tendency to suicide is never anything, at least in melancholy, a murder of another, the other bad, how to get rid of another evil which is within.
The death I can only come back if, under the investiture of the subject can be treated as an object itself, if it is allowed to run against himself the hostility that falls on an object and succeeds to the reaction original objects of the self to the outside world. (P. 311)
But if for some vicissitude of the ego development can not be an object for himself, mainly because it was never invested as such by parents, then opens up the possibility of thinking of this hostility and this hatred in the manner of C. Bollas to the point that in a clinical situation presents what he calls the "Self - negative view." It refers to the patient's attempt to become an object of hatred for the analyst to feel strengthened its link with the object and profess some degree of intimacy with him to bring his hatred regain hope and has a sense of merging with analyst, whose equanimity until then - even if it had shown empathy or sympathy, "you felt as a refusal or rejection.
"This person wants to turn the analyst in a negative object, ie an object that is distinct from itself, but carries its projections and identifications, it is a psychological situation is little differentiation self - object, and seek convert a discrete object in an undifferentiated, and they do through a hatred lover: part of the individual recognizes the independence of the object, while the other assumes that self and object are fused. Only when objects have been merged self (Kohut) negative, the person is inseparable from the other. In some ways it seems that a discrete object is a lost item or not an object.
can identify a form of hatred that serves the death drive, and I am of the opinion that some forms of autism in children reflect this desire to annihilate the world of objects for the purpose of being back in the pre-object-world. "(p. 160)
hatred The child interpreted as the refusal of love from their parents, and their constant distance or roughness, and find that their most intense cathexis intimate with parents is imbued with hatred . To some extent, these children perceive the need to hate their parents.
"If you hate a person is destructive of his internal objects, we know that the emptiness you experience is due to destructive activity. With its internal objects damaged or unusable, there is nothing valuable, and the person would only feel the coldness of the objects destroyed or evacuated space vacuum. But exactly the opposite is true for these people: Here hatred is a form of relationship with the object, and hate in order not to destroy, but to preserve and maintain it. Hatred does not emerge as a result of the destruction of internal objects, but as a defense against the void. " (Bollas, p. 161)
perhaps
These children suffer from a kind of anguish of emptiness, a state that is the product of intense isolation. Emotional life is so poor that hardly cathect objects. Such a person has the feeling of losing the rest of psychic life, fear the finishing of her emotional life. Such an individual discovers that if someone annoys or inspires hatred in the other, has temporarily guaranteed a psychic life.
this way is via identifcación with the lost object, it is possible to explain the hatred and attachment. Effect of secondary identification, since has replaced the object relation. In the withdrawal is carried inwards to the object, even a hate object, an object is present. Thus, the hatred also avoids the task of making a match by the omnipotence of the object.
Anxiety is an almost omnipresent factor in any mental process, and there is no possible way to make progress, either in theory or in the clinic, without a deep understanding of this affection.
In his text 'The Panic' Laplanche gives us a shortcut to link their own perspective of Freudian metapsychology, to understand the common ground between the anguish, the IDS, narcissism, object loss, ambivalence and melancholy, putting the unbinding with the object and the withdrawal narcissistic need to protect the ego of his own hatred toward the lost object, external and introjected.
Christopher Bollas offers an idea of \u200b\u200bhate, not the opposite of love and therefore the force link, but as a substitute. That is, the hatred is there to keep a link with the object.
I know there may be little justice to think together a theoretical fully rooted in exegesis Freudian metapsychology and more rigorous, with a position like Bollas, who in addition to Klein quoted at positions that give much more room for environmental effects, such as the relationship with the real mother is constantly referred to by Winnicott.
However, I think it is possible to try to explain the hatred, not as something that breaks the tie, but as something that supports it, since the model of melancholy as it is transmitted by Laplanche, in anguish.
In the internal structure of the book is a model for studying deeply consistent with making of psychoanalysis, which is holding a series of questions in relation to another, the thought of another, which in turn open up more Network of thought, without worrying too much to close roads and gates. The flight of dogmatism is a central task of analytical thinking.
Then, I will summarize some of the concepts that form the main lines: the problem between the drive and the object as the source of sexual fate, Eros and Civilization to the issue of repression, the crushing of the drives in the ego of the individual, the notion of censorship as barriers between systems and how the whole topic, directly or indirectly is linked to the notion of self and image of it. The issue of multiple definitions of self as a filtration system, such as content, as an instance, as representation.
The effect of anxiety as a drive activity, expression of somatic register stimulated by bodily sensations, many of which occur in contact with the mother, not as a source, but as an end. But that translated in terms of affection has to do with the anxiety caused by unconscious experience of helplessness and incompleteness, decay and the threat of death (by neglect of the object) as the primary space of the unknown.
One source of trouble is the inability of the total discharge of the drives. There is a desire in the fantasy of total discharge because the discharge itself produces pleasure, tension release, relaxation. Repression or dam we impose the reality principle prevents us from this download illusory.
In the second theory of anxiety Freud, 1924, ('Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety') develop new ways: on one hand is the notion of danger (anxiety as the response to the threat or the preparation for this, and On the other hand the new developments in relation to the ego of the second topic. The self is indicated not only as a place of trouble, but you can repeat the anguish of their own, at least as a signal.
In anguish, I struggle to maintain its integrity against its own painful experiences of objects that threaten to annihilate. Klein left, consistent with this, the experience of the divided self, the fear of being divided into pieces. The ego, Freud tells us, is primarily a "self-body." The synthetic I have a compulsion or even a reparative tendency, a tendency which was particularly focused Melanie Klein, and significantly, under the title of Eros, the life instinct.
C. Bollas refers to me as an unconscious organizing process that reflects the presence of mental structure. "The ego is a mental structure that develops from the dialectic of interior and exterior, the structure of the self is a story of personal development, all the attitudes, feelings and operations I suggest, even if we are unable apprehend the imprint of an object relationship. "(p. 22)
" Mother and son continually negotiate an intersubjective experience that coheres around the rites of the need psychosomatic. "Bollas writes (p.29)
Since there is no denying the truth instinct, "understood as the body is the repository of the first experiences that give rise to mental life," and it is also undeniable existence of an external object that is there from the start and is active in the exercise of 'awakening' to the life of the body and fantasies, the idea is still debatable whether it is the fantasies with which internal object structure to me, or if the fantasy is a reflection of me. Can there be aimless drive?, Can be drive without fantasy? There
Freud not only a theory of displeasure, but a theory of pain, which in relation to the body is considered as burglary. Displeasure, pain and distress related to the psyche and the body, as ways to bypass or metaphor as communicating these two domains: the psychic structure (particularly the ego) and the body. Writes in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety": "... we can see how the ideas proposed in the project clearly indicate the pain as a fundamental experience. Castration anxiety and anguish of death, ie, the absence of reference in the most essential experience of anguish.
There is a constant, since the start in his writings, of anguish and lack of respect, the absence of the object. Instead of the presence or the object representation (no) is the primary pain as basic experience of the psychic life, and the possibility of establishing all its mechanisms.
"Pain is an element left in parentheses, although we know on the other hand, the explanation that Freud gives of pain. It is an explanation 'economic', the pain is always a rush of energy that breaks or threatens to break a barrier, a limit (conceived as the limit of the body, skin boundary, or barrier or the boundary of I). "(Laplanche, pag. 297)
Anxiety involves re-live the terror oblivious to the disappearance of the big Other not only by this means to us with his presence and care, but because early identifications are so labile, that in an absence long enough to do just intolerable, it becomes a feeling of disaster and helplessness on me.
In an era of history Freud 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1915), and at one point the wording of Laplanche on anxiety, focus on the study of depression particularly melancholic depression. As part of the disease "moral", such neurosis (or psychosis) in particular that the moral seems to be in the foreground, are primarily obsessional neurosis and melancholia. The loss is the starting point of melancholy.
This writing is inseparable from one that is in 1914: Introduction to narcissism. And two points in the first instance we are interested in narcissism.
"On one hand, the introduction of the instance of the ideal and the superego, on the other, a reflection on the notion of object and object choice (...)
The original concept of narcissism: self-love and only himself, without any object libido, sense of omnipotence, the child's ego would enjoy all the qualities: a state that resembles megalomania. The child's narcissistic ideal is itself a reflection, or projection, the ideal of omnipotence (dethroned) that parents projected onto him.
'If we consider the attitude of parents towards their children tender, we will discern as a revival and reproduction of narcissism, has long abandoned. The overestimation, make clear that we cherish as narcissistic stigma and in the case of object choice, governs this bond. So the compulsion prevails attributed to the child of every kind of perfection, and conceal and forget all its shortcomings (which has a close relationship with the denial of infantile sexuality). ... Disease, death, renunciation of enjoyment, restrictions on free will and have to be in force for the child, the laws of nature and society should stop before it, and really should be again the center and the core of creation '(Freud, 1914, p.87)
This well-known passage ends the pretense of wanting to place, whether within the child or within the parent, the original narcissism: one can say that the narcissism of the parents is one of their own narcissism reviscencia child, but equally one can say that infantile narcissism is nothing that an identification by the child and a projection by the parents of their own narcissistic ideal dethroned. Whatever, anyway, the significance of infantile narcissism, it is true that quickly suffers a fate that brings him down: the castration complex. "(Laplanche, p.292)
Via this series of identifications and loss, appears object's shadow falling on the ego and the adult leaves some trace of their existence.
"The object can cast its shadow without a child is able to handle this relationship by mental representations or language For example, when a father uses his son to hold (...)
projective identifications must consider the experience that the child makes his first object. This is, of course, the mother, who is less known as a discrete object endowed with special qualities as a process that is bound to be the infant and the alteration of its existence. "(Bollas, p.18) explains
also a child 'embedded' in a family experience that is incomprehensible to him, failed to organize the experience in fantasies that cover the subject, save, therefore, the 'state of their own' determined by location unknown.
Word cushions and possible give new meaning to the angst. Enables it to transform and become the experience in a construction of meaning. This is not just for the elaborative effect of words, but mainly because they realize the presence of 'someone' that contains the baby, by his desire to provide reassurance. This presence is to be introjected as a good object originated. I anchor stone.
is, in Freud's work, "the first time that starts to show what will be the center of the new topical division of personality in identificatory instances, true personalities within the person , which were not instances of the first topic, much more abstract (...)
The 'ideal self' is placed next to an idealization of the omnipotence of the self: it is an idealized self, a self led to the best of his omnipotence. On the contrary, 'the ego ideal' appears as something that would stand against me as their ideal, certainly more linked to the problem of law and ethics. Feelings of inferiority should be placed rather on the side of the ideal self, and feelings of guilt or moral failure on the side of the ego ideal. "(Laplanche, p. 293)
The fact is that this omnipotent narcissism must find shelter somewhere and that is the 'ideal body' which is moved and perpetuates: "And on this I now love lies ideal self in childhood that I enjoyed the real. Narcissism appears shifted to this new ideal ego, as the child is in possession of all perfections valuable. The man is unable to waive the satisfaction of which once enjoyed. Do not want to forgo the narcissistic perfection of his childhood (...) and try to recover it in the new form of the ego ideal. What he projects before him as his ideal is the substitute for the lost narcissism of his childhood in which he was his own ideal. "(Freud, 1914 p. 91)
Back to Mourning and Melancholia, extending the feelings that make up the picture of depression, bereavement, bound to object loss, but also depression with feelings of inadequacy, of inadequacy, of not-worth, depression with self-accusation, guilt depression characterized melancholy. Freud
will distinguish three levels: first, the level of grief, then the level of pathological mourning, finally, melancholy.
"What is located in the center of the duel? This is what is indicated and with narcissism: the demonstration of the concept of object and certainly their loss. What matters in mourning, as in the other two models we will explain is the strength of the relationship with the object and what comes when that bond is tested.
The state of mourning can be described in a certain number of symptoms: loss of interest in the outside world, the loss of the ability to choose a new object of love, estrangement any productive work that is not related to memory the dead. This inhibition and the depletion of I express an unconditional surrender to grief.
inhibition is thus not a purely negative, is the fact that the subject is busy elsewhere.
The subject is so busy doing a job, But how does this work Grief? Its foundation is due to this: if the object has disappeared, the connection to the object exists, so the subject is facing a triple option. The first to perish with the object and the second, subsisting on the loop, it is also keeping the object, quasi-magical, almost hallucinatory or frankly. Are prolonged indefinitely duels in which the subject keeps alive the lost person is still living with her and eventually hallucinations. Third possibility: the duel itself. In this case respect for the reality that prevails on the bonding, the reality requires the subject change, to annul their relationship with a person that henceforth no longer present. "(Laplanche, p. 297)
essential part of this work is that as the attachment to the lost object increases before declining, efforts are needed to assemble and integrate into the psyche an image of that object built using the 'cleavage parties good and bad of the object, partial idealization, partial identifications, particularly with the good points of the object, desexualization loop with the object, which is coupled with idealization, and finally you can recall what is the relation to the Oedipus detachment : continue the work done in common, but leaving the parent, the beloved object. " (Laplanche, p. 298)
In all these aspects of the object, and at different times, the speech is going to permeate, so that each time the analysis is to ask Who's Talking Now?, what aspect of what the subject has taken the floor, and for whom?, who am I now facing the speaker? It is necessary to analyze the characters, or even the 'partial characters' involved in the life of the transfer. That is, an analysis of the identifications.
C. Bollas writes that the clinician must accept "being used as an object and be guided through their own inner world, between memory and the subject keeps their object relations (...)
analyst should not modify the intensity of the transfer by sending the patient back to his mother and his early life, until he has confronted and examined the nature of mental life on the inside of the transfer. "(p. 22)
The picture of melancholy, as described in the text on p. Laplanche 299, is largely identical to a picture of grief, but more accentuated, and with something else: moral pain reaches its climax clearly expressed so pathetic, the inhibition is much stronger also accompanied with a total neglect most basic care, such as food, the loss of interest by the outside world beautiful in this case with an absolute self-centeredness, the loss of the ability to love is put to the fore by psychiatrists, because they also brag about the sick, who accuse their own inalienability and this, in apparent contrast to the pain that otherwise reveal. "The patient has described in his self as unworthy, sterile, morally despicable (...) he humbles himself before everyone else and commiserations to each family to have ties with one so unworthy." (Freud, 1915 p. 244)
This and other signs suggest something that underlies the construction of these symptoms, which responds to a deeper truth that has to do with the second point of the dynamics of melancholia, the point that interests me most: the identification with the lost object.
The subject certainly know who has lost but not what that person has lost. Ignore what the type of relationship with that object, the Freud aspects that will highlight are: the fact that a link was ambivalent, and that was a narcissistic loop. Hatred is a similar loop, while at the same time is ambivalent, divided and narcissistic.
In the first instinct theory of Freud, love and hate were conceived as fraternal twins. Love wanted to get pleasure and pleasurable things, and hate it unpleasant expelled to the outside world, equating hatred with destruction: "The ego hates, abhors and pursues a destructive to all objects which are to him sources of unpleasant feelings" (Freud, 1915)
Hatred had two potential functions: go to a soul purpose (reproduction of a state above) if he was considered an aspect of the death instinct, or play a purely expulsive - destructive if it was conceived in the earlier theory of instincts.
"psychoanalytic theory are not lacking in references to the destructive hatred. If we now consider the hate in the theory of object relations, we assume in the course of a complex an internal object is damaged or destroyed and I was faced with the difficult task of renegotiating the inner reality following the trail of that hatred. An internal object damaged by hatred can lead to a flight phobic external representations of the object, or a state of depression addictive that constitutes a compromise formation between the desire to do more damage to the object and the fear of being attacked from within because that destructiveness.
I think that in some cases a person hates his order not to destroy, but to do just the opposite: keep the object. That hatred is fundamentally non-destructive by its intent and, although it may have destructive consequences, it is possible that its purpose is act in an unconscious form of love: it preserves the link by way of maintaining a passionate negative cathexis of it. Viewed this way, the hate is not the opposite of love, but his replacement. A person who hates so no fear of retaliation from the object, in contrast, welcomes you. In contrast, lives in fear of indifference, if not noticed or seen by the other. The passionate hatred is generated as an alternative to love, which is unattainable. " (Bollas, p. 148)
Think of it as that identification with the lost object has many features in common with the identification with an object destroyed or damaged. The disruption and devastation are integrated to me by way of an object attacking from the inside, that poor, and that via projective identification can then be living abroad.
Returning to the comparison with grief. In the match we had a loss of the object; herein is intended to Freud have something as a loss of self.
The discussion with the object, in mourning, melancholia is transposed to the discussion of the self. The melancholy begins with a duel, since there is always something that is foreign to a loss, that shortly after comes to be internalized. In the duel, the object "missing" in every sense of the term: in the sense that it is not already, and the sense of foul us. (Why hast thou forsaken me?)
will have to ask, in any case, what is the missing object (in transfer)? and, in what space is placed the damaged internal object, is currently placed on the side of the analyst or the patient?
Identification with the lost object: "Freud distinguishes between two types of identification. Identification which replaces the choice of subject, ie the ambivalent relationship (made of love and hate) with the other. The prototype of this identification is in the Oedipus complex, in this case, the ambivalent relationship with the father to the man, made of rivalry, but also of love, is partly transformed into identification with the father secondary identification. Secondary, not only regarding the fact that it comes after a investimento object, but also by relation to a mode of identification that would be the most primitive of the relationship with the object of primary identification to come, not replace a relation to the subject, but to coincide with it: it is at the same time relation to the other and assimilation with the other. In the early relationship with the mother, coupled with love and inclusion are: love of the breast, chest incorporation, are one and the same thing to love is to enter itself, is to take the chest. "(Laplanche, p.304)
On the narcissistic emphasis Freud, unlike Melanie Klein, who will stop at the ambivalent aspect of the loop.
To show that character of relationship with the object in melancholia, Freud part of a specific trait is self-accusation and guilt consuming.
"Both in scientific and in the therapeutic would be fruitless to try to oppose it against the patient against his self promoting such complaints. That in some sense has to be right and has to paint something that is as he seems "
(Freud, 1915 p. 244)
Freud never said so clearly extent to which the analyst must begin by listening, keep track of what is said, to the end, instead of treating the symptom as wishful thinking that should be corrected.
"Once in a material sense, factual, the melancholic is right. Melancholy indeed makes it useless, worthless. Perhaps the melancholy not do more to grasp the truth more clearly than others, not melancholy. When an extreme self insignificantucho is depicted as selfish, insincere, a man dependent only striven to hide the weaknesses of their status, perhaps in ourselves we seem to be pretty close to self-knowledge and we only intrigue the reason why one should get sick to reach a truth "(Freud, 1915 p. 244)
In the same spirit, C. Bollas explains that the patient compels the analyst to experience their inner world of objects. Part of the mental representations that a patient keep their objects, will be a fairly accurate record of the true nature of that mother's personality as reflected in the care of the child, while others communicate mental representations of the inner world projective identifications the infant. Each organization
analyzing real experience to constitute a suitable material for a powerful mental activity, as is the projection.
In Mourning and Melancholia, another notion is still convoluted with the idea identification, it is the notion of narcissism and narcissistic object choice, that is, taking itself as object of love. But two running alongside interpretations of psychoanalytic thought. One would make it narcissism, a sort of closed circuit of self-sufficient monad, which is no longer possible to distinguish a subject and an object. For another current, however, narcissism can not be understood only as love directed at me, it constituted a kind of direct relationship with the other. From this second perspective (Laplanche) we can say that narcissism is narcissistic identification are one and the same thing.
From this point, Laplanche (p.306 - 308) makes a somewhat cryptic explanation of the movements of the self through the intricate web of identities. I will summarize the essential ideas of this point to go after studying the process in which ambivalence and I can split the back part against himself (via identification)
Having located narcissistic identification, hay a little better equipped to understand the 'narcissistic object choice. " This narcissistic object choice object to object choice for shoring. In latter, love, sexuality and more specifically, he points the way to the vital relationship with the other relationship related to self-preservation.; in this way, the relationship of sexuality will be marked not by an identity with the other, but by a kind of complementarity. By contrast, the narcissistic object choice, the choice is both complementary to each other much the same. His motor is always a hidden identity.
What are the dynamic characteristics of the narcissistic choice, those that allow us to better understand what happens in melancholia? It would be a contradiction between its high stiffness, and great fragility. Rigidity and inflexibility, lack of adaptation to the contingencies of the object. Fragility in the sense that the lowest gap, the lowest failure of the object, just by touching that point identificatory, may cause a withdrawal and an abandonment of the object.
The melancholy is precisely what we observe, this withdrawal, this neglect, to the point of the leak. The time of the loss can be so blind that only by analyzing it is discovered.
There must have been the one hand, a strong fixation on the object of love, and the other a low resistance of the investiture of the object.
Consequently, a regression of the election narcissism narcissistic object, the self investimento. But even that withdrawal marks the totalitarian nature of the relationship narcissistic. This withdrawal is not a pure and simple neglect, is a sharp ability to re-find himself free of any object. The recall involves the object interior. It is then a new ID, a secondary identification, which is created in the process melancholy: "The shadow of the object falls on the ego, which can then be judged by a particular instance as an object, such as the abandoned object."
If 'the shadow falls on me' is because the object was already selected on the model of self. We have therefore
passage the narcissistic choice, loss of object, identification with the lost object.
This explains why the melancholic debate is a debate with himself, which replaces the discussion with the external object as given in the match.
But why the melancholic debate with himself takes this extremely aggressive, as plaintiff, destructive and even deadly in the suicide of melancholy? The notion of identity is not enough to explain it, we need a new development in terms of a third factor, which is the factor of ambivalence.
Ambivalence is the coexistence of love and hatred in any relationship with the object. At the juncture of impulses in relationship with the other, is always exposed to the possibility of disunity. And what is called 'transformation' of love into hate is nothing to Freud, the alloy disunity. Once this divisive primary alloy is ambivalent object loss. Always the lost object is the object to free herself. Provided the loss is attributed to the unconscious to an abandonment, a fundamental unassisted, which is ultimately that of the mother, the loss of love.
In Freud is the passion, hatred, which makes the otherness between thought, making it possible death. Thanks to the mark of failure, arises mark the origin of thought. In this sense, development can be seen as a defense against anxiety. While it is she who reigns within the psychic apparatus are secured by the silence of not knowing. Silence distress and disorganization, but that is at once the source of knowledge of the other work. Hence, when the need is thwarted, there is the anger and the interim, the anxiety. So also, as endogenous and constitutive masochism appears as a defense against death anxiety. Returning to Laplanche
: "We in the match: object loss, in pathological mourning, object loss ambivalence.
In melancholia, the object is introjected but as 'bad object'. The lost object is, as any object of love, both good and bad. And even if it was his good looks that dominated (consciously at least) in the ambivalent affair at the time of their loss is 'cleaved' and 'introjected' bad only in the form. Why? On the one hand because every lost object is somehow a bad object. Moreover, because the subject, has a particularly intense ambivalence, much more than usual in the relationship. Finally, because the loss is often a total loss. Freud insisted that the loss in melancholia, is a loss hidden secret. This is not contingent until absolutely necessary. Indeed, there is only one part of the object which is affected and this is precisely the good part. Therefore, the object is damaged, deprived of what he did, in the eyes of the subject, good and like it, is reduced to its bad side and that side is the introjected. Here is how Freud described this process without recourse, however, the notion of splitting and without insisting on the fact that it is only bad aspect of the introjected. (P. 310)
"This conflict of ambivalence, sometimes external source, other constitutional rather, it should not be overlooked among the premises of melancholy. If love for the object (...) takes refuge in narcissistic identification, hatred rages that purpose replacement insulting, denigrating, causing him to suffer and gain from this suffering sadistic satisfaction. "(Freud, 1915 p.248-9)
Laplanche adds that the tendency to suicide is never anything, at least in melancholy, a murder of another, the other bad, how to get rid of another evil which is within.
The death I can only come back if, under the investiture of the subject can be treated as an object itself, if it is allowed to run against himself the hostility that falls on an object and succeeds to the reaction original objects of the self to the outside world. (P. 311)
But if for some vicissitude of the ego development can not be an object for himself, mainly because it was never invested as such by parents, then opens up the possibility of thinking of this hostility and this hatred in the manner of C. Bollas to the point that in a clinical situation presents what he calls the "Self - negative view." It refers to the patient's attempt to become an object of hatred for the analyst to feel strengthened its link with the object and profess some degree of intimacy with him to bring his hatred regain hope and has a sense of merging with analyst, whose equanimity until then - even if it had shown empathy or sympathy, "you felt as a refusal or rejection.
"This person wants to turn the analyst in a negative object, ie an object that is distinct from itself, but carries its projections and identifications, it is a psychological situation is little differentiation self - object, and seek convert a discrete object in an undifferentiated, and they do through a hatred lover: part of the individual recognizes the independence of the object, while the other assumes that self and object are fused. Only when objects have been merged self (Kohut) negative, the person is inseparable from the other. In some ways it seems that a discrete object is a lost item or not an object.
can identify a form of hatred that serves the death drive, and I am of the opinion that some forms of autism in children reflect this desire to annihilate the world of objects for the purpose of being back in the pre-object-world. "(p. 160)
hatred The child interpreted as the refusal of love from their parents, and their constant distance or roughness, and find that their most intense cathexis intimate with parents is imbued with hatred . To some extent, these children perceive the need to hate their parents.
"If you hate a person is destructive of his internal objects, we know that the emptiness you experience is due to destructive activity. With its internal objects damaged or unusable, there is nothing valuable, and the person would only feel the coldness of the objects destroyed or evacuated space vacuum. But exactly the opposite is true for these people: Here hatred is a form of relationship with the object, and hate in order not to destroy, but to preserve and maintain it. Hatred does not emerge as a result of the destruction of internal objects, but as a defense against the void. " (Bollas, p. 161)
perhaps
These children suffer from a kind of anguish of emptiness, a state that is the product of intense isolation. Emotional life is so poor that hardly cathect objects. Such a person has the feeling of losing the rest of psychic life, fear the finishing of her emotional life. Such an individual discovers that if someone annoys or inspires hatred in the other, has temporarily guaranteed a psychic life.
this way is via identifcación with the lost object, it is possible to explain the hatred and attachment. Effect of secondary identification, since has replaced the object relation. In the withdrawal is carried inwards to the object, even a hate object, an object is present. Thus, the hatred also avoids the task of making a match by the omnipotence of the object.
"The object's shadow fell on me, who,
hereinafter could be tried by a particular instance
as an object, such as the abandoned object.
Thus the loss of the object was moving in a
loss of self, and the conflict between the self and the beloved,
a bipartition between self critical and I altered
for identification. "
Freud
Hate me for mercy I beg you,
measure hate me without mercy,
I hate more than indifference ...
References Bollas, Christopher. (1987) The shadow of the object. Buenos Aires. Amorrortu
Editors. 1991
Freud, Sigmund (1914) Introduction to narcissism, OC, 14, 1979
(1915) Mourning and Melancholia, in OC, 14, 1979
Laplanche, Jean (1980) The Anguish I. Issues Good Aires. Amorrortu
Editors. 1988
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